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The attached SD documents the originator's analysis only. It shall not be used as the final or sole document for affecting changes to an authorization basis or safety basis for a facility or activity. 
J u s t i f i c a t i o n D e t a i l s
The superceded document ( WHC-SD-WM-CN-045 Rev 0) has been updated and revised in response to reviewer comments and i s being reissued as WHC-SD-WM-CN-045 Rev 1.
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Change Impact Revieu: I n d i c a t e t h e r e l a t e d documents (other than t h e engineering documents i d e n t i f i e d on Side 1)
Enter t h e affected docunent nunber i n BLock 20. A b s t r a c t : T o x i c o l o g i c a l and r a d i o l o g i c a l consequences were c a l c u l a t e d f o r a maximum sodium f i r e i n t h e 2727-W Sodium Storage F a c i l i t y . The sodium i s s o l i d and cannot l e a k o u t o f t h e tanks. The maximum f i r e t h e r e f o r e corresponded t o t h e maximum c r o s s -s e c t i o n a l area o f ne tank. It was shown t h a t r e l e a s e of t h e e n t i r e f a c i l i t y i n v e n t o r y o f "Na i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o produce an appreciable e f f e c t .
SDDIDD
TRADEMARK DISCLAIMER. trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otheruise, does not necessarily c o n s t i t u t e or imply i t s endorsement, recomnendation, or favoring by the United States Government o r any agency thereof OP i t s c o n t r a c t o r s or subcontractors. These are v e r y s u b s t a n t i a l s t a i n l e s s s t e e l tanks (having been used as s h i p p i n g c o n t a i n e r s f o r t h e sodium) w i t h an i n s u l a t i n g l a y e r o f r e f r a c t o r y b r i c k approximately 1 f t t h i c k covered by aluminum sheathing (DOE 1995) . The sodium i s s l i g h t l y contaminated w i t h "Na w i t h a h a l f l i f e o f 2.58 y. present t o t a l f a c i l i t y i n v e n t o r y o f "Na i s estimated t o be 0.005 C i i n t h e t o t a l sodium i n v e n t o r y o f approximately 276,000 l b (125,000 kg) (WHC 1996a). The P r e l i m i n a r y Hazard A n a l y s i s f o r t h e 2727-W Sodium Storage F a c i l i t y i d e n t i f i e d several p o s s i b l e scenarios f o r r e l e a s e o f NaOH. It has been judged t h a t t h e o n l y c r e d i b l e scenario i s a p a r t i a l b u i l d i n g c o l l a p s e and t a n k damage due t o h i g h wind w i t h accompanying r a i n l e a d i n g t o a sodium-water r e a c t i o n and a sodium f i r e i n t h e damaged tank.
The tanks
The
The approach taken here i s t o p o s t u l a t e a sodium pool f i r e w i t h an area corresponding t o t h e maximui cross-sectional area o f one tank. sodium i s s o l i d and cannot l e a k o u t o f t h e tank, t h i s w i l l maximize t h e sodium r e l e a s e r a t e and w i l l bound a l l o f t h e accidents l i s t e d i n t h e P r e l i m i n a r y Hazard A n a l y s i s . Only t h e maximum r a t e o f r e l e a s e o f NaOH i s o f i n t e r e s t here s i n c e i t w i l l be shown t h a t t h e e n t i r e f a c i l i t y i n v e n t o r y o f ' ' Na i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o produce an appreciable e f f e c t .
Since t h e P o s t u l a t e d Scenario:
The i n i t i a t i n g event i s assumed t o be a h i g h wind which causes major damage t o t h e t h e b u i l d i n g . 1996) which corresponds t o a f a s t e s t m i l e wind speed o f 70 mph (ANSI 1982). T h i s f a s t e s t m i l e wind speed has a frequency o f exceedance on t h e 200 Areas o f about 2E-3/y (LLNL 1985).
A f a l l i n g b u i l d i n g member i s assumed t o break o f f a l a r g e p i p e connection i n t o t h e t a n k i n such a way t h a t t h e opening i s p o i n t i n g upward. The b u i l d i n g r o o f i s assumed t o f a i l i n such a way t h a t r a i n i s channeled i n t o t h e t a n k opening. The wind i s then assumed t o slow t o a low speed and a heavy r a i n begins t o f a l l .
The b u i l d i n g i s r a t e d f o r a wind l o a d i n g o f 20 l b / f t 2 (WHC
The r a i n i s channeled i n t o t h e open t a n k causing a vigorous sodium-water r e a c t i o n which generates l a r g e amounts o f hydrogen and heat. i n s i d e t h e t a n k i s then assumed t o be i g n i t e d causing an e x p l o s i o n which f u r t h e r damages and opens up t h e upper h a l f o f t h e t a n k and r e s u l t s i n a sodium f i r e over t h e e n t i r e upper surface o f t h e sodium w i t h i n t h e tank. Two o f t h e tanks are f u l l , one i s h a l f f u l l and t h e remaining two are n e a r l y empty except f o r r e s i d u a l heels (DOE 1995) . The t a n k which i s h a l f f u l l i s t h e one assumed t o be damaged i n o r d e r t o maximize t h e exposed sodium area w i t h i n t h e tank. t a n k t o cause s i g n i f i c a n t damage t o any o f t h e o t h e r tanks.
The r a i n i s then assumed t o stop and t h e wind speed t o remain low i n o r d e r t o minimize washout o f releases and maximize downwind exposures t o t h e sodium combustion product r e l e a s e which i s assumed t o be converted e n t i r e l y t o NaOH i n t h e m o i s t a i r .
Given t h e major damage t o t h e b u i l d i n g due t o h i g h wind, t h e remainder o f t h e scenario l e a d i n g t o t h e l i m i t i n g sodium f i r e i s very c o n s e r v a t i v e l y estimated t o have a p r o b a b i l i t y o f 1% (engineering judgement by a n a l y s t ) . T h i s i m p l i e s an o v e r a l l frequency f o r t h i s accident o f a t p r o x i m a t e l y 2E-5/y which i s w e l l w i t h i n t h e extremely u n l i k e l y category (IO-t o 10-6/y).
The hydrogen
It i s n o t expected t h a t enough energy would be a v a i l a b l e o u t s i d e t h e D e s c r i D t i o n o f o o s t u l a t e d release:
The p o s t u l a t e d maximum r e l e a s e r a t e corresponds t o a sodium pool f i r e w i t h a s i z e equal t o t h e i n t e r n a l t a n k dimensions, i . e . , 12 ft (3.7 m) diameter by 20 ft (6.1 m) e f f e c t i v e l e n g t h based on t h e 1 ft i n s u l a t i o n t h i c k n e s s and t h e volume o f t h e t a n k (DOE 1995). The maximum area o f t h e f i r e i s then 240 ft' (22.3 m2). remains o f t h e t o p h a l f o f t h e t a n k o r presence o f any N, cover gas. standard open pool sodium burn r a t e o f 8 l b / f t 2 h r (10.8 g/m2s) w i t h an aerosol r e l e a s e f r a c t i o n o f 35% were assumed (Foust 1978) . Data on open sodium f i r e s (Johnson 1979) i n d i c a t e s t h a t about 90% o f t h e sodium combustion product i s Na, O w i t h about 9% Na CO, and l e s s than 1% NaOH. Because o f t h e a b i l i t y o f Na, O t o r e a c t w i t h water t o form NaOH, however, a l l o f t h e sodium r e l e a s e d from t h e f i r e i s normally assumed t o come o f f as NaOH w i t h 1 g o f sodium producing 1.74 g o f NaOH. The r e s u l t i n g maximum NaOH r e l e a s e r a t e i s (22.3 m2)(10.8 g/m2s)(0.35)(1.74) = 147 g / s .
No c r e d i t was taken f o r any f i r e suppression e f f e c t s by t h e The
TRANSPORT ASSUMPTIONS:
Although a f i r e n o r m a l l y i m p l i e s some degree o f thermal l o f t i n g which would reduce ground l e v e l a i r concentrations ( e s p e c i a l l y near t h e f i r e ) , t h e i n t e n s i t y o f t h e f i r e , and t h e r e f o r e t h e degree o f l o f t i n g , cannot be p r e d i c t e d . sources f o r purposes o f e s t i m a t i n g d i r e c t r e c e p t o r exposures.
For t h i s reason, f i r e s are normally assumed t o be ground l e v e l For a ground 2 level release the onsite receptor is normally assumed to be at a distance of 100 m in the worst direction (WHC 1988) . purposes of this analysis is located at the site boundary or the near bank of the Columbia River, whichever is closer, in the worst direction. No receptor evacuation was assumed.
Acute 99.5 percentile ground level release dispersion factors (X/Q) have been generated using the GXQ code (Hey 1994) at each of the 16 sectors at 100 m and at the site boundary or the near bank of the Columbia River. Since toxicological exposures, and therefore maximum air concentrations, are normally the primary concern for a sodium fire, no plume meander was assumed.
The resulting X/Qs are reported in WHC-SD-WM-SARR-016 (Savin0 1996) as 3.41E-2 s/m3 onsite (100 m E) and 2.83E-5 s/m3 at the site boundary (8.76 km N).
The site boundary receptor for
Radiolosical hazard:
The sodium stored in the 2727-W Facility is slightly contaminated with "Na with a half-life of 2.58 y. is estimated in the Preliminary Hazard Analysis to be about 0.005 Ci (WHC 1996a). The dose due to a release Q of "Na can be calculated using the standard formula Dose = 9 x (X/Q) x (BR) x (DCF) where BR is the light activity breathing rate (3.3E-4 m3/s) and DCF is the dose conversion factor. The dose conversion factor for "Na is 2.07E-9 Sv/Bq (7.66E+3 rem/Ci) (EPA 1988) . The release of the entire facility inventory of ''Na would therefore produce an inhalation dose of only 4.31E-4 rem in the onsite receptor at 100 in E and 3.58E-7 rem in the site boundary receptor at 8.76 km N on the near bank of the Columbia River. Both doses are negligible even for a non-mechanistic release of the entire building inventory. The corresponding risk evaluation guidelines for the extremely unlikely frequency range are 10 rem (100 mSv) and 4 rem (40 mSv) (Bacon 1996) for the onsite and site boundary receptors, respectively.
The total facility inventory at the present time
Toxicoloqical exDosures:
By the definition of the X/Q, the maximum air concentration of NaOH at a receptor location is just the product of the maximum release rate and the receptor X/Q. A maximum release rate of 147 g/s with no fallout would therefore produce a concentration of 5.01Et3 mg/m3 at the onsite receptor 100 m from the release point. ordinarily be supported in the air at a point away from the source, however, is about 100 mg/m (ANSI 1981) . This corresponds to a very heavy dust condition. rapid agglomeration and fallout of the combustion particles in the first 50 to 100 m, the air concentration at 100 m downwind is actually much lower (i.e., less than about 20 mg/m3) (see detailed discussion in attachment 1). Even so, since this effect cannot be quantified, 100 mg/m3 is normally conservatively
The highest particulate concentration which can Data from open sodium fires (Johnson 1979) indicates that, due to assumed a t a d i s t a n c e a t l e a s t 100 m downwind o f a heavy p a r t i c u l a t e source (WHC 1996b) . The corresponding c o n c e n t r a t i o n a t t h e s i t e boundary can be c a l c u l a t e d by u s i n g t h e r a t i o o f t h e X/Qs a t t h e o n s i t e and s i t e boundary r e c e p t o r s . x (2.83E-5 s/m3)/(3.41E-2 s/m3) = 0.083 mg/m3.
The maximum c o n c e n t r a t i o n a t t h e s i t e boundary i s then (100 mg/m3) Conclusion:
As p r e v i o u s l y demonstrated, t h e r a d i o l o g i c a l e f f e c t s o f t h e "Na contamination i n t h e sodium are n e g l i g i b l e even i f t h e e n t i r e f a c i l i t y i n v e n t o r y i s released. (Any a c t u a l r e l e a s e would be much l e s s . ) The o n l y e f f e c t o f concern due t o t h e maximum f i r e described here would be t h e t o x i c o l o g i c a l exposure t o t h e o n s i t e r e c e p t o r a t 100 m downwind. maximum a i r c o n c e n t r a t i o n was very c o n s e r v a t i v e l y estimated a t 100 mg/m3 based on maximum a i r l o a d i n g . range t o 10-6/y) t h e o n s i t e t o x i c l i m i t i s t h e ERPG-3. as a c o r r o s i v e / i r r i t a n t w i t h an ERPG-3 o f 100 mg/m3 (Van Keuren 1995). The worst-case s i t e boundary r e c e p t o r would be exposed t o an estimated maximum NaOH c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f 0.083 mg/m3. The corresponding l i m i t f o r t h i s r e c e p t o r i s t h e ERPG-2 which f o r NaOH i s 40 mg/m3 (Van Keuren 1995). The r e s u l t i n g sums o f f r a c t i o n s (SOF) of t h e l i m i t s are t h e r e f o r e 1.0 and 0.0021 f o r t h e o n s i t e and s i t e boundary receptors, r e s p e c t i v e l y .

For t h i s r e c e p t o r , t h e
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WHC-SD-WM-CN-045 Rev 1 E s t i m a t i o n o f NaOH A i r Concentration a t 100 m
Based on Actual Test Data F i v e sodium combustion product r e l e a s e t e s t s were conducted i n t h e open atmosphere a t t h e Idaho N a t i o n a l Engineering Laboratory (INEL) (Johnson 1979) .
The purpose o f t h e t e s t s was t o determine f a l l o u t d i s t r i b u t i o n s and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s (chemical and p h y s i c a l ) o f t h e combustion products. Four o f t h e t e s t s i n v o l v e d f o r c i n g h o t sodium through j e t and spray nozzles where i t burned on c o n t a c t w i t h t h e a i r . The f i f t h t e s t ( t e s t no. 4 ) i n v o l v e d a pool
f i r e , b u t t h e f a l l o u t data were n o t t a b u l a t e d . Tests no. 1 and 2 were chosen f o r comparison because t h e r e l e a s e was from moderate h e i g h t s ( 5 and 6 m, r e s p e c t i v e l y ) , and because these two t e s t s covered n e a r l y t h e f u l l range o f t h e spread i n downwind ground contamination data (see F i g u r e 4 i n t h e Reference). are i n c l u d e d i n t h e same f i g u r e and c l o s e l y match t h e r e s u l t s from t e s t no. 1.
The r e l e a s e s i n t e s t s no. 3 and 5 were elevated (30 in) and were i n t h e form o f j e t s which tended t o produce l a r g e r Na p a r t i c l e sizes. t h e r e f o r e judged t o be l e s s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f a ground l e v e l pool f i r e .
I t was noted d u r i n g these t e s t s t h a t t h e r e was a r a p i d i n i t i a l f a l l o u t o f t h e sodium combustion product p a r t i c l e s l e a d i n g t o heavy d e p o s i t i o n f o r about t h e f i r s t 50 m downwind o f t h e f i r e . assumed t h e t y p i c a l exponential decrease w i t h d i s t a n c e ( i . e . , l i n e a r on a l o gl o g p l o t ) as expected. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e p a r t i c l e s i z e d i s t r i b u t i o n was measured as a f u n c t i o n o f downwind d i s t a n c e f o r t e s t no. 4 ( t h e pool f i r e ) .
The r e s u l t s show t h e expected decrease i n p a r t i c l e s i z e s as one moves away from t h e source.
geometric d e v i a t i o n ( u ) o f 1.67 w h i l e a t 200 m t h e median diameter dropped t o 20 pm w i t h a ug o f 1.9d. The c o n d i t i o n s o f t e s t s no. 1 and 2 are shown i n t a b l e 1. Note t h a t these were both spray releases w i t h t h e wind speeds measured a t t h e r e l e a s e h e i g h t s . I t was observed t h a t v e r y heavy f a l l o u t occurred w i t h i n t h e f i r s t 50 t o 100 m downwind even f o r t h e h i g h e r wind speeds (and t h e r e f o r e l e s s f a l l o u t t i m e ) .
The ground contamination r e s u l t s from t h e pool f i r e ( t e s t no. 4) Tests 3 and 5 were Beyond t h e f i r s t 50 t o 100 m t h e f a l l o u t A t 100 m t h e median p a r t i c l e diameter was 35 pm w i t h a The 35 pm median particle size at 100 m implies a gravitational settling velocity given by Stokes equation in the form where r is the particle radius (1.75E-5 m ) , g is the gravitational acceleration (9.8 m/s2), p is the density of the particle (2.27E+6 g/m3 for Na,O), and p is the viscosity of air (0.018 g/m.s). the settling velocity of the median particle is 8.4 cm/s. Knowing the release time from Table 1 above, the average air concentration at a point 100 m downwind of the source can then be deduced from the fact that the final ground deposition (g/m2) is equal to the average air concentration times the settling velocity times the plume passage time (approximately equal to the release time).
It is evident here that we are dealing with a particle size distribution rather than a single particle size. half the particles were smaller and half were larger than this size. turn, implies that half the particles had fall velocities less than 8.4 cm/s and half the particles fell faster than 8.4 cm/s. The primary concern here, however, is not with particle fallout rates, but with mass fallout rates. In a particle size distribution, the larger particles obviously have larger masses per particle than the smaller particles. particle diameter would therefore be larger than the median particle size of 35 pm, and hence the mass weighted average fall velocity would be higher than 8.4 cm/s. air loading and the results are conservative in this regard.
Average measured sodium ground contamination levels at 100 m were reported as 1.9E-2 g/m2 and 1.6E-2 g/m2 for test 1 and test 2, respectively. corresponding derived air concentrations are 0.96 mg/m3 Na (1.7 mg/m3 NaOH) and 0.60 mg/m3 Na (1.1 mg/m3 NaOH). Note that the effective NaOH release rates for these two tests were 164 g/s and 139 g/s which are nearly identical to the release rate of 147 g/s assumed for the fire described in the main document. (The usual 35% aerosol release fraction was not applied here since these were elevated spray fires.)
The relatively high wind speeds and neutral to unstable atmospheric conditions present during these tests would tend to increase the dispersion (i.e., decrease the X/Q) and are far from worst-case. decreased transport time accompanying such conditions, however, would also produce a competing decrease in the short range fallout rate. difference in conditions between tests 1 and 2 would produce a decrease in X/p by about a factor of 8 due primarily to the differences in the dispersion coefficients uy and uz between Pasquill D and Pasquill A stability. The two inferred average air concentrations shown above are expected to be somewhat less than the maximum air concentrations because (1) samples were taken in a 90' arc (to include plume meander) and averaged, whereas the sodium fire plume was observed to cover only about a 30' arc. Even allowing a factor of 10 for this effect, however, would still indicate air concentrations far less than the 100 mg/m3 maximum air loading usually assumed for conservatism. 
